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Who’s in charge? Corporations as institutions
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ABSTRACT In most accounts of global governance, where corporations are included, they
are seen as either subject to various international organisations’ regulatory impact or are
identified as having (benign or malign) influence over agenda setting around the scope and
practices of global regulation. However, here I examine a third dimension that has hitherto
been under recognised: this article starts to develop an analysis of the terrain that global
corporations govern themselves, sometime singularly, sometimes collectively and sometimes
collaborating with the more “normal” institutions of global governance. I seek to develop an
account of how the corporation governs this terrain and the mechanisms that businesses
have developed (or utilised) to maintain their authority. I suggest that it makes sense to
understand global corporations as directly analogous to more “normal” institutions of global
governance, and that discussion and analysis of global governance needs to integrate this
third dimension if it is to examine the full spectrum of governance beyond the state. This
article is published as part of a thematic collection dedicated to global governance.
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Introduction
In this article I am not going to discuss how variouscorporations have shaped the agenda of particular institutionsof global governance, nor am I going to set out the impact that
globally focussed regulatory institutions have on particular
business sectors or corporations. These two common perspectives
might be regarded as conceptualising the relationship between
corporations and global governance as either input (helping shape
the agendas of global governance institutions) or output
(corporations impacted by institutional decisions) (Brühl and
Hofferberth, 2013: 354). Rather, I propose a third perspective,
one that is missing from the alternatives set out by Brühl and
Hofferberth in their survey of approaches that see companies as
social actors: that the global corporation itself has a significant
governance role within its own international structures, and we
can usefully consider this as a form of global governance in itself.1
This complements the emerging account of corporate
constitutionalism that extends the analysis of corporate
governance (Bottomley, 2007), to suggest that global
corporations’ governance function reaches well beyond the
internal relations between managers and shareholders. Indeed,
while the United Nations Global Compact (UNGC), the
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and other
organisations indicate there is a growing recognition in (global)
policy circles that improving the governance function of
corporations can have beneficial effects across their supply
networks, there has been less discussion of how this governance
function might be best understood as a political economic issue,
rather than merely a technical question of effective economic
control. Coe and Yeung’s (2015) recent work on global production
networks also maps out much of the space I am concerned with,
and offers a dynamic account of supply/value chain development,
but their account lacks any significant non-economic dimensions
to how governance might be understood. Indeed, given that
“governance” is often presented as the importation of business
values and processes into politics (Eagleton-Pierce, 2014), it is
perhaps surprising that corporations’ (extra-economic)
governance of their own networks has remained under-
remarked. Therefore, this article is concerned with the wider
network of relations represented by the supply chain assembled
and governed by contemporary globally active corporations.
Patterns of organisation vary widely between corporations
(Dicken, 2003: 212–219), not least as the legal systems in which
they are incorporated may be different (common or civil law
systems) and have different national regulatory expectations.
Furthermore, in some sectors such as resource extraction or
infrastructure there are often a number of major corporations
that may be owned partly or completely by the state. Never-
theless, here I will focus on the question of governance in general
rather than look at actual corporate networks (as will be required
to further develop this approach). What follows is different from
much discussion of (global) supply chains that focusses on their
management,2 as it suggests there is a governance function being
undertaken by corporations, which is characterised by explicit
and implicit power relations, not only the technical management
of efficiency in network interactions. These forms of authority do
not necessarily reach beyond a corporation’s own network(s), but
because of the global reach of such networks their political
economy parallels many of the characteristics more usually
identified in the realm of global governance. Hence, rather than
examine corporations as either influencing global governance
institutions, or negotiating regulatory interactions with these
institutions, both of which remain important issues, here I argue
that our understanding both of global governance and the
political economy of the global corporate sector can be enhanced
by taking a third (complementary) view. This is to say, it will be
enlightening to assess global corporations as institutions of global
governance themselves.
A permissive (albeit brief) definition of global governance
The first step is to establish a definition of global governance that
is both acceptable and permissive of inclusion of corporations.
The first aspect—that of scale—is relatively easy to resolve: when
we talk of global governance the two distinctions we are making
are between domestic and non-domestic, and between the
international and the global. The former is a question of state
sovereignty, borders and national politics; global governance may
have an impact on this realm of politics but is not limited to the
territory delimited by any particular state’s borders. The
distinction between international and global draws attention to
those aspects of governance that are not merely manifest between
states on a bilateral or (explicitly) multilateral basis; “global” is
intended to convey something about the (potentially) compre-
hensive character of this emerging complex of governance
institutions (Weiss, 2013: 28). Although not all institutions of
global governance have a comprehensive reach—many are
limited by membership and almost all are limited by mission or
sector—the institutions commonly included within the term do
not suffer such limits to their collective globality. The term
“global” conveys the potential rather than actuality of the scale of
activities of any individual institution and is more accurate if all
institutions of global governance are taken as a single collective
class, developing a global complex of governing norms.
The second term, governance, was introduced into political
analysis to identify governing as a process which was not limited
to formalised state-constituted institutions. There is immediately
some analytical difficulty around the interchangeable use of
institution and organisation: the latter having a formal existence
(headquarters, secretariat, rules, members) while the former has
come to be seen as considerably more permissive, used to also
include laws, customs and social practices that are unorganised in
the sense of the latter term (Weiss, 2013: 29–31). This leads Weiss
(2013) to offer the following definition:
global governance is collective efforts to identify, understand
or address worldwide problems that go beyond the capacities
of individual states to solve … the capacity within the
international system at any moment to provide government-
like services and public goods in absence of a world
government. Thus, it is the combination of informal and
formal values, rules and norms, procedures, practices and
policies, and organisations of various types that offer a
surprising and desirable degree of global order, stability and
predictability. (32)
Weiss suggests that the provision of “order, stability and
predictability” is delivered through global governance by a diverse
set of (formal) organisations and (more informal) institutions. If
in this conception the particular types or institutions or
organisations is (relatively) permissive, based on effect rather
than character, then the key issues must be scope/scale—global—
and the provision of order, stability and predictability in this
realm of interactivity. Therefore, while Weiss does not draw this
explicit conclusion, these aspects of governance could be
delivered or enacted by a corporation, rather than a regulatory
organisation of some sort.
We also need to consider the forms of socio-political power
that have informed the development of the institutions of global
governance, an issue sometimes obscured by more organisational,
functional or technical accounts of specific institution’s history
(Pierre, 2015: 190–202). The sources of power deployed through
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global governance are no more or less complex than social
analyses of power would be in other political economic realms. In
Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall’s (still) influential typology
of forms of power in global governance we find various forms of
power arrayed across four dimensions: compulsory (through the
deployment of resources); institutional (through rules); structural
(via the control of agendas of practice); and productive (or as it is
often referred to constitutive—the ability to define the political
realm and practices themselves) (Barnett and Duvall, 2005; see
also, Lukes, 2005). This typology of dimensions of power across
global governance is reflected in Kennedy’s (2009) observation
that the
globalisation of law, the legalisation of politics and economics,
have brought with it a tremendous dispersion of law. All
manner of rules, enforced and unenforced, may, as a matter of
fact, affect any global transaction. And as a matter of law there
are conflicting and multiplying jurisdictions, asserting the
validity or persuasiveness of their rules, with no decider of last
resort … We will need to assess the dynamic and distribution
effects of one or another attitude toward the disorderliness of
global governance. (55–56)
The elements of this dispersion and disorderliness that interest
me here are those that we can identify within the overall
organisational structure of global corporate extended and
networked supply chains. This is to say that global governance
happens in a wider field of social relations than is often explicitly
mapped.
Therefore in this article I suggest that if we examine global
corporations’ networks including their affiliated subsidiaries and
their contractors we will be able to recognise a realm that looks
remarkably similar to global governance as usually presented.
Moreover, corporations’ governance function underpins the
competitive advantage gained by globally active corporations:
corporations not only seek to manage the impact of a globally
integrated political economy on their operations, but also the very
opposite; they seek to shape, (re)form and govern the political
economic terrain in which they operate to their advantage
(Picciotto, 2011: 68). To establish the utility of an approach that
sees corporations as institutions of global governance, I will now
set out how the character of global corporate networks can be
included within the dimensions of global governance explored
briefly above.3
Global corporations as institutions of global governance
To some extent the approach herein parallels Lynne Dallas’
notion of the power model of corporate governance (counter-
posed to the efficiency model). Here, the corporation
actively seeks to structure its environment to serve its needs of
autonomy and discretion. While certain concrete realities
exist, such as the scarcity of resources, how these resources are
used and distributed is a matter of social organisation,
dependent on cultural, historical, social and power factors.
(Dallas, 1988: 114)
The decisions made by the corporation are not necessarily
directly concerned with efficiency or profit maximisation but
rather with the perpetuation of control and the values stressed by
the central management group(s). Moreover, these values are
likely to vary from sector to sector: corporations in the
pharmaceutical or high technology sectors will have considerable
more interest in the manner in which their networks treat, use
and protect intellectual property rights (IPRs) (May, 2010) than a
corporation in the food sector might do. Likewise, corporations
in capital intensive industries such as energy generation will
confront different governance issues from clothing retailers with
extensive and complex supply chains. For instance, a high-
technology corporation will be concerned not just with the
manner in which partners use specific IPRs but also the national
legal context, such as a state’s government’s willingness to enforce
such rights; Chinese (lack of) willingness to enforce IPRs has in
the past been identified as an issue for the development of some
supply chain relations. However, for clothing and/or assembling
networks, the impact on the brand of labour relations will be a
larger concern with contractors seeking to either distance
themselves from unwelcome developments (such as the Rana
Plaza fatal building collapse) or by seeking more direct control of
labour standards in the supply chain though forms of relational
contracting.
As these examples illustrate it is likely that the corporation may
be effectively managed by a coalition of stake-holding groups
focussed on a myriad range of outcomes including immediate
profitability but by no means limited to it, and therefore as
corporations have become embedded in more fragmented supply
chains so these coalitions have often needed to resolve internal
conflicts over various competing outcomes (Dallas, 1988: 40–42).
As this suggests we immediately need to differentiate between the
control of the corporation and its beneficial ownership.
Certainly, much of the discussion on corporate governance in
recent years has been concerned with aligning the interests of
corporate managers with the (often presumed) interests of the
corporation’s shareholders (its beneficial owners). Ways are
sought that ensure managers focus on and prioritise “shareholder
value”, a frequent proxy for rising share prices and maintaining
dividend payments. That there has been considerable policy and
legislative work on alignment suggests that hitherto owners and
managers have not necessarily shared a view on how corporations
should be managed. There is much to be said about this aspect of
corporate governance (not least the effective extent of the division
between ownership and control) but here I want to emphasise
that even if we accept some form of alignment is necessary, it
does indicate that the governance and control function of the
corporation is not fully articulated to ownership (when firms are
incorporated at least) and thus management groups within
corporations are often governing (to some varying extent)
autonomously. Taking an optimistic view of managerial interests,
the chief outcome of the governance function is the direction and
implementation of a chosen competitive strategy across its supply
network. A more pessimistic view, which has driven much of the
discussion of alignment and incentivisation, is that managers
manage the corporation in their own interests and not the
shareholders (presenting a classic principal-agent problem for
resolution). This is further complicated by corporations them-
selves being owners of subsidiaries and thus across a range of
different relationships are both principal and agent.
Partly due to the frequent requirement for local operations to
be incorporated under local states’ laws, contemporary global
corporations are often actually groups of separate companies
controlled through various means from a central point. These
networks are frequently arrayed around a hub, even if the formal
and legal arrangements are organised in such a way as to partly
obscure this fact, and the states where the hub is located have
little effective regulatory control over the entire (dispersed)
network (Veldman, 2013: S25). However, the corporation needs
to establish a working balance between centralisation (direct
control) and the existence of a network of (formally) autonomous
partners and contractors, which is where governance comes in.
Governance from this central point is seldom entirely
hierarchical but is more often a process of negotiation and
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engagement. The central corporation may have distinct advan-
tages but subsidiaries, contractors and others may also have forms
of leverage that can be deployed within supply chain decision-
making.4 Thus, where the core corporation is contracting with
partners to access particular technologies, or localised resources
or knowledge(s), the contractor may have significant leverage
opportunities within any contractual relation. The central
corporation may also seek to benefit from “reverse diffusion” of
practices and innovations where these have been developed in
one part of the network; here governance is concerned with how
to establish the new practice/approach around the network.
In addition, the corporation at the centre of the network may
have multiple interests and thus present competing positions to
partners, shifting and changing the focus of potential leverage.
For instance, particular sub-contracting partners in the network
may get a very different steer from the Corporate Social
Responsibility (CSR) team that visits their plant to ascertain
their compliance with various standards and requirements, than
they will from the buying team, whose emphasis is likely to be on
price and quality.5 Focusing on corporations as institutions of
global governance suggests the reasons for differences between
high-level commitments and what happens within the supply-
chain itself; like other governance institutions, global corporations
have complex bureaucratic managerial arrangements which
produce difficulties of coordination between policy and practice
(a not uncommon observation within global governance
analyses).
Following David Ciepley, we can posit that “within its
jurisdiction, the business corporation exercises powers analogous
to those of government, if more limited, including the right to
command, regulate, adjudicate, set rules of cooperation, allocate
collective resources, educate, discipline and punish” (Ciepley,
2013: 142). However, while Ciepley and others are right that
when compared to the sovereign state there is considerable
difference in the scope and range of such legitimate capabilities
(Crane et al., 2008: 72–76), when we compare the global
corporation to the typical institution of global governance these
differences are considerably less significant. The corporation can
actually be in a stronger position as regards its network than a
globally-focussed institution or organisation is as related to its
issue area (or constituent state members). Corporations may well
be able to more effectively sanction and govern network members
than some international organisations can govern state members.
Moreover, global corporations have developed processes that
often mimic legal structures. This then negates many unwelcome
consequences of globality; in the absence at the supranational
laws of property or contract, the global corporation’s network of
subsidiaries and affiliates respond to the internalised law-like
rules and regulations the core corporation puts in place (Gessner,
2012: 151), and less to differences in national legislation. Within
its own network (or effective jurisdiction) the corporation is a
form of governing body, adopting as Ceipley suggests many of the
attributes of government; the authority it is able to mobilise,
however, is not completely separate from government, but rather
flows from the legal mechanisms (such as incorporation and
property law) that facilitate corporations’ operational modes in
specific jurisdictions. The corporation’s governance function is
not against the state, but rather is partly facilitated by the state
(Robé, 1997), and where differences in national legislation are to
the corporation’s advantage, the relationship between globalised
internal rules and national laws is finessed to ensure both
elements serve the corporations’ needs.
Therefore, although global corporations certainly interact with
the other institutions of global governance, they also govern
significant realms of the global political economy, sometimes in
conjunction with the regulations and guidelines of other
institutions, sometimes as single governing authorities them-
selves. While using forms related to, and indeed constituted by
states, their actual character and effect within the corporation’s
“internal” relations (that is within its networked supply chain not
only within its incorporated core) are defined by the corporation
not the (or a) state (Robé, 1997: 66–67). Where corporations are
constituted differently from the dominant Western model,
perhaps incorporated in states across the Global South, or are
State Owned Enterprises, although the formal/legal issues may
vary considerably, prompting in some cases considerably different
governing practices, the underlying requirements for efficacy are
likely to be similar (even if this would need to be confirmed by
research into specific cases). This is to say: to be effective (even if
state sanctioned) forms of supply chain, or network governance
need to be regarded as legitimate by network partners,
contractors and participants.
The legitimacy of corporations’ governance function
The construction of the legitimacy of corporate network
governance needs to take place across three initially negative
aspects of power relations: differences in circumstances; dispa-
rities in interest; and requirements for compulsion (Beetham,
1991: 59–63). First, the difference between the core/organising
corporation and its partners needs to be legitimated: this may be
achieved through recognition of the ownership of technology or
through appreciation of brand value(s), through access (albeit
indirectly) to established sales networks and/or via other
resources or assets that can only be utilised through the network.
Second, the subordination of decision making (governance)
which results from involvement in the network has to be
demonstrably in the interests of participants; how involvement
allows partners to effectively access various assets within the
network is key. Third, to remain legitimate the relation must be
(or at least plausibly be seen as) consensual; negotiations around
“incomplete contracts” and conditions of supply will have
significant impact on whether the governance of the network is
regarded as legitimate or exploitative.6 Differences between actors
might also be justified through “cognitive” legitimacy (linked to
the acceptance of market relations as themselves being generally
legitimate), but where relations go beyond the one-off spot
market contract, legitimacy makes supply-chain governance more
effective. The core corporation needs to manage these networks
more subtly than merely attempt to construct command and
control arrangements that are more costly in time and other
resources.
Legitimacy may be less of an issue where network partners are
not actually independent of the core corporation. As corporations
are now mostly legally constituted to allow them to also own
companies themselves, in these cases governance is legally
established (and not required to be consensual). Corporations
can benefit from the limited liability afforded to investors/
shareholders, shielding the central (governing) corporation from
some risks and liabilities in the network, and establishing a range
of political economic firewalls to enhance the security of the
central organisation. Indeed, part of the purposes of global
corporations’ governance function is the control of risk from
outlying areas of the supply chain while harvesting the economic
and other benefits of engagement with such partners (low wage
costs; new technologies; new markets and so on). However, the
core corporation then has its own principal/agency issue to
resolve, in that it needs to ensure subsidiaries are working in the
interests of their (corporate) owners.
These complex networks of both subsidiaries and indepen-
dent companies are tied together through a web of contracts
(Picciotto, 2011: 132–133). While the character of these supply
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chain networks is perhaps specific to contemporary capitalism,
management itself, as James Burnham pointed out in a
remarkably prescient analysis over 70 years ago, is always about
controlling (and benefitting from) the access to resources
(Burnham, 1941 [1972]; see also Ciepley, 2004). Defining the
managerial revolution as the shift in society from a privileging of
ownership, to a society where increasingly power stemmed from
control and/or management of institutions, Burnham suggests
to us how and why global corporations’ managers have become
defacto agents of global governance.7 Specifically, when we think
of global corporations’ governance function the key issue is not
necessarily the ownership of assets and resources, but rather
the ability and abiding interest in controlling access to those
resources (Rajan and Zingales, 1998). While significant parts of
the supply chain network are outside the ownership structure of
any particular global corporation, the ability to control access to
the central resources of the network and also (through non-
competition clauses in contracts, for instance) an ability to
constrain access by competitors to key “independent” elements
of the network is an important element of corporations’
governance function. Although the ownership structures of
global corporate networks are often complex, it is the
management and control of these networks that produces
identifiable governance effects.8
This management interest is not limited to the issue of prices
or market conditions but rather given their network character,
it is also (crucially) an issue of managing time and space; a
global corporation’s managers seeks to control its own political
geography to maximise its returns and remain a going concern
(Dixon, 2014: 62–63). As Dallas contends the chief, and
perhaps only really effective, lever that corporations have is
their ability to mobilise and allocate resources across the space
they seek to control. Here we should understand “resources”
widely to include “social products” including influence,
legitimacy and preferences that the central managerial coali-
tion governing the supply-chain can deploy to shape more
micro-level decision making (Dallas, 1988: 83–84). This can
also be seen as the institutionalisation of particular network-
specific relations, habits and socialised knowledge about what
would be regarded as normal activity. Furthermore, a key
outcome of corporations’ governance of their networks is the
transfer of risk (another social resource) away from the central
corporation and onto other stakeholders and/or partners in the
supply chain. Seeing corporations as global governance
institutions requires a focus on ongoing relations within these
networks and not merely a view of a series of periodic intra-
network transactions.
For example, global corporations set standards and rules in
many market sectors directly via the contracts that are used to
pattern the supply chain, but also because many global sectors
actually function as effective oligopolies (Harrod, 2006: 25), and
as such are controlled by a small group of corporations whose
managers even if not colluding with each other share a broad set
of interests.9 The acceptable and normal practices in often quite
closely bounded markets segments are set by a small number of
corporations. The corporation(s) at the centre of these supply
chains seek to perpetuate their positon by re-creating this
environment where and when possible, and as change/
innovation is required, shaping it to maximise their capture of
any associated advantages or benefits (Dallas, 1988: 98), while
shifting the risks associate with change into the supply chain—
costs of transition are often borne by contracting partners not the
core corporation itself.
Within these networks corporations construct regimes of
private law to govern the relations between the various elements,
while also seeking to influence public law institutions; private law
can be manifest through standard setting as well as through
contract law more generally. The use of private law (contract
provisions and arbitration agreements) often utilises public
international law as a background justification but equally is
crafted to serve the needs of the particular corporate network in
which it is deployed (Gessner, 2012: 158–159), rendering this part
of that corporation’s governance functionality. However, as
Danielson (2005) has pointed out
the decisions and actions of corporations have social
consequences largely indistinguishable from those created by
public regulators, but... corporate decision-making [i]s largely
insulated from public participation, engagement or scrutiny...
If corporations are significant institutions in the transnational
governance regime, then policymakers and activists will need
to find ways to affect the decision-making of these corporate
institutions. (424)
The democratic deficit often identified as compromising the
legitimacy of global governance, is repeated and is likely more
serious where corporations by their very actions are regulating
economic interactions, even if these are also shaped by various
other regulatory regimes and to a large extent internal to
contracted networks across their global supply chains. The choice
between competing standards, differential corporate governance
regimes and the incorporation of national rules into standard
corporate practices allow corporations to decide which regimes
they might use, how they interpret them and if, as in the face of
no acceptable standards or rules they can and need to set their
own for their network’s internal relations.
A key challenge of governance for many corporations is that
theirs may only be one among a number of supply chains serviced
by a particular supplier, and their ability to govern the actors
involved is therefore incomplete; moreover there is much less
clarity (than for states for instance) about the legitimate reach of
corporations’ jurisdiction as regards the other organisations in the
supply chain, and hence their need to work to maintain
legitimacy within the network. One might expect that the more
any sub-contracting network partner was dependent on the core
corporation the more compliant they would be, although there is
also an issue of specificity of their own technology and/or other
assets that might mitigate the asymmetry of power prompted by a
narrow range of network engagements. This leads Macdonald
(2014) to characterise the governance of supply chains as
exhibiting “decentralised, non-hierarchical dynamics, without
established deliberative processes or other norm- or procedure-
governed mechanisms to determine outcomes or resolve conflict”
(179). For our purposes this then demonstrates the utility of
developing a critique of (global) governance in these circum-
stances, identifying how parallel problems in other issues areas
have played out. Thus for instance, where the governance of
labour standards has become an issue for the core corporation,
then there may be a political need for the governance function,
and the regulations to which it is applied to become a more
collective (which is to say “democratic”) endeavour among a
number (sometimes quite a large number) of corporations/
contractors and civil society actors. Here the internal governance
function of the corporation and the realm of private authority, as
exemplified by civil society organisations (and civil regulation)
interact.
Global governance by global corporations
If the supply chains of global corporations are effectively a realm
of global governance then how might we understand the practices
that characterise this governance function? A range of supply
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chain management mechanisms that are relatively widely
recognised includes:
 contractual contingency planning: recognising that contracts
will be incomplete as they are unable to definitively predict all
eventualities between contracting partners;
 target setting: may be part of the initial contract or a continuing
set of negotiations between the contracting supplier and the
core corporation (or a designated intermediate node in the
supply chain);
 operational reviews: ranging from issues around quality of
product through to internal (or external) reviews related to
process and conduct, often linked to core corporations’ CSR
undertakings;
 information sharing: including data utilisation, revised and new
technological specifications as well as advice on efficient
processes/practices;
 joint problem solving: building on data/knowledge sharing,
core corporations may seek to develop solutions with particular
partners to enhance efficiency or compliance with adopted
standards;
 supplier support: here corporations may aid partners develop
their businesses through the provision of guidance and direct
aid of various forms (utilising organisations like the Supplier
Excellence Alliance for instance).10
While these are all important to the profitable and effective
management of the supply chain, the overarching governance
function is intended to ensure that these practices remain
uncontentious and acceptable to the contracting suppliers.
This network governance function is manifest in four key
dimensions: firstly, the history of interactions between the
corporation and its supply chain “partners” will have some
influence over the manner in which the current relationship is
governed—current arrangements will reflect prior engagements;
secondly, a range of economic issues from tooling costs to
investment in labour preparation (training, recruitment) and
other (potentially) relationship specific costs shape relations;
thirdly these are linked to technological issues around access to,
and development of, new technologies; and finally a range of
political issues can shape any relationship (from external state
political concerns to internal micro-political considerations)
(Cousins, 2013). Governance therefore will be concerned both
with the generalised needs of the supply chain alongside the
particular requirements of specific interactions within it. Indeed,
popular demands that corporations act responsibly under the
rubric of CSR already recognise that corporations are effectively
governance institutions able to prompt shifts and changes in
practices (albeit imperfectly) within the political economic spaces
they govern (Anderson, 2006: 34; Macdonald, 2014: 169). It is
relatively common then to recognise that corporations are
political institutions, as well as economic ones, but this is seldom
pushed to assess the more general governance function that such
recognition must imply!
Gary Gereffi and Joonkoo Lee have very helpfully developed a
typology of general governance forms that pattern global supply
chains; their analysis aims to understand the manner in which
governance practices allow the capture of value across the
supplier network, often referred to as a global value chain
analysis. Their five types of supply chain governance range from
hierarchical at one end (essentially fully integrated corporations
with wholly owned subsidiaries) to market governance at the
other, where all interactions in the chain are conducted via the
market and governance is merely through the price mechanism
(spot market). Between these two extremes a new set of “specific
exoskeletal institutional arrangements” have been developed,11
facilitating a range of balancing points between competition and
cooperation, while also allowing for periodic re-organisation of
production networks to deal with new challenges.
It is the three intervening types that reveal the sites of where
the (global) governance function of corporations (and large firms)
is evident. These are:
 Modular: Suppliers work to the standard specifications of
purchasing agents in the chain; while these can be complex,
communication between suppliers and purchasers allows these
intermediate goods to be relatively easily specified.
 Relational: Relations are deeper, involving negotiations about
burden sharing and knowledge transfer; these will be increas-
ingly based on social ties between partners and burgeoning
trust relations.
 Captive: Relations are (perhaps) pathological, with suppliers
increasingly dependent for their ongoing profitability on a few
(or even single) buyers/networks operating under conditions
that are relatively rigid and/or intrusive and may be specific to
a particular supply chain network (Gereffi and Lee, 2012:
25–26).12
Crucially, in extended supply chains or production networks,
different parts of the network may be characterised by different
types of interaction.13 In the past these general forms of supply
chain were mobilised around core production-focussed
corporations but increasingly global supply chains (especially in
textiles and consumer technologies) have become organised by
and around key buyers, controlling global brands. The particular
relations within networks fall into one or more of these broad
categories at least partly on the basis of the possibility (or lack of
possibility) of easily codifying requirements for the supplier. The
more complex the requirements (the more tacit knowledge and
coordination required) the more likely relations will move from
modular, to relational to captive at that point in the network
(Gereffi et al., 2005). Thus, governance failings and the lack of
ability to achieve required supply outcomes may shift relations
into more explicitly integrated forms of governance and by
doing so increase the direct exercise of power by the central
coordinating corporation (but also its costs in time, organisation
and resources).
When requirements are easily codified or even standardised
(commodity-like) supply requirements, governance of relations
may be mostly through a combination of contracts and/or
tendering standards, that at the limit are completely undertaken
as spot market interactions. However, as the intermediate goods
required in the supply chain become more complex then
increasingly technical standards, quality control mechanisms,
service level agreements and other more developed contractual
elements may be deployed to govern the relations. Seldom can a
contract effectively deal with the intricacies of ongoing supply
chain relationships on its own, and thus effective governance is
crucial to the success of any network. This recognition that
contracts are always incomplete (by virtue of the future being
indeterminate) has often been treated as an argument for some
(mission critical) functions to be brought within the formal legal
borders of the corporation to allow for a flexible but hierarchical
control. However, the need to control risk still may produce a
preference for inter-firm contractual relations, leading to a need
for a normative element to governance, to allow the corporation
to achieve its particular strategic requirements from the supply
chain. Moreover, while seeking to govern the internal network
relations, corporations may also seek to obscure these relations
from various external regulatory agents (Seabrooke and Wigan,
2014), leading to information asymmetries between them. Thus,
the control of codification, alongside the definition and
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interpretation of acceptable practice all become important
elements of the global corporate governance function.
Many corporations therefore have developed detailed codes of
conduct for their network “partners”. These codes reflect the
direct needs and requirements of the core corporations around
process, and often can reflect concerns about the perception of
how a corporation enacts is purported social responsibility. CSR
can be seen as a signalling function, to consumers (around brand
differentiation), to workers (to attract and retain certain sorts of
prospective employees) and to governments (to forestall more
legalistic and formal regulation); corporations promoting CSR are
trying to say something about themselves even if some critics
regards such invocations as being articulated in bad faith, and a
mask for the operation of a rapacious global capitalism. Indeed
sometimes it seems that the assessment of risk has moved from a
primary concern with impact of actions on others, to a concern
for the risk that the publicity around adverse impacts may have
economic costs to the corporation itself. Where this aspect of risk
becomes central, critics understandably see CSR as merely
marketing or a cynical interest in brand values. Thus, to add
credibility to these codes (sometimes voluntarily, sometimes
under political pressure) the auditing of compliance can be
outsourced to other organisations in what Vogel (2010) has
referred to as “civil regulation”. Responding to perceived publicity
effects and issues of brand integrity, some global corporations
such as Levis or US Whole Foods have quite significantly shifted
their practices (most often related to their supply chain) in
response to codes of conduct emanating from civil regulatory
organisations. The approach of marrying internal codes of
conduct to external regulatory competence has perhaps been
taken furthest in the (albeit controversial) UNGC,14 and the
development in the mid-2000s of the UN’s “Norms on the
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other
Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights”.
While there may be differences on the effectiveness of these
norms, what is notable is that they imply a clear recognition of a
direct governance function for the core-corporation over its
complex networked global supply chain. The required adminis-
trative processes and evaluative mechanisms are at the very least
analogous to, and in many ways directly parallel, the more often
recognised institutions of global governance.
Global governance research and global corporate networks
Perhaps the most obvious link between an analysis that sees
corporations as institutions of global governance and previous
political economic analysis is the work on private authority (see
for instance Hall and Biersteker, 2002; Büthe and Mattli, 2011).
Here the focus is on the manner in which private actors are able
to shape and inform the practices and structures of global
governance. However, this approach seeks to understand global
corporations as network actors deploying their authority (built up
through their market activities) to shape existing institutions of
global governance. Global corporations may be deploying their
authority to influence existing institutions or through standard
setting (and other normative mechanisms) seek to establish new
institutions that reflect their collective interests, for instance by
normalising market-based decision making. Global governance
remains something corporations seek to inform, influence and
shape beyond their own networks. Conversely, as I have
developed above, global governance is something global corpora-
tions are doing within their own networked relations, suggesting
that they have less need to rely on external private authority and
are often directly governing their own networked supply chain.15
The first element of this refocussing is to recognise that the
relations of the global corporate supply chain are like other social
networks; they are patterned by power relations. In the first
instance, this is the core corporation’s ability to deny access to the
supply chain itself. In this sense, the networked supply chain
resembles the pro-actively assembled group of partners that
pattern almost all institutions of global governance: joining the
network requires the explicit acceptance of institutional rules or
conditions; prospective members must commit to the conditions
of the network, but also to accept the governance of the lead
corporation, as members of global governance institutions
expressly accept the leadership of the institutional secretariat
(however constituted). Once a firm has joined the network, apart
from the threat of expulsion (for whatever reason), there is also
the question of the allocation of resources, tasks and activities
which are the subject of the governance function and are the
result of power relations within the network (adapted from
Baudry and Chassagnon, 2012). However, the final sanction of
removal from the network is hardly the basis of a nuanced
governance regime, and thus a more complex analysis is required.
Moving away from the threat of network-expulsion, and
following the analytical approach adopted by Fuchs (2007), the
power of corporations in global governance can be disaggregated
into three elements: instrumental power—encompassing direct
influence, based on the deployment of corporations’ extensive
and diverse resources; structural power—revolving around rule-
making and the establishment of agreed rules of practice; and
discursive power—by which certain settlements are politically
legitimated outside the formal processes of rule adoption, and
corporations have been able to normalise various aspects of their
practices and needs (56–58). The first dimension Fuchs identifies
relates to the exit-threat issue, and to corporations’ ability to
control access to their producer/supplier networks. The second
dimension plays out in the supply chain through the multi-
faceted negotiation and surveillance activities that I have
discussed above. This element is clearly strengthened by a
(perhaps variable) ability to utilise the exit-threat in specific
instances (although when there have been significant sunk costs
in an on-going network relation a break would not be cost-
neutral for the core-corporation, and contractors are well aware
of this). The discursive element in the governance of the supply
chain is evident in the manner in which the corporations’ codes
of conduct seek to normalise specific behaviours and practices,
but most importantly through supplier support and contractor
engagement intending to socialise partners into the particular
ways of working of the supply chain.16
This can be then linked to Michael Barnett and Raymond
Duvall’s frequently cited typology of forms of power in global
governance, which as noted above, encompasses four elements:
compulsory, institutional, structural and productive power. While
Barnett and Duvall allow that the resources that may be deployed
as compulsory power may include symbolic and normative
resources, for our purposes this maps relatively easily on to Fuch’s
instrumental power. The second element, institutional power
seeks to capture the manner in which certain actors can further
their interests and end via sets of institutionalised rules and
practices (Barnett and Duvall, 2005: 16–17). If we regard the
market as an institution, then market imperatives fit into this
element, as do issues around legal regulation and (perhaps) codes
of conduct, although that is perhaps more ambiguous. Barnett
and Duvall’s third element, which they call structural looks a little
different from Fuch’s conception, primarily due to their focus on
how this element of power constitutes socio-economic capacities
by allocating these capacities differently, and influences actors
perception of their place and possibilities for action (Barnett and
Duvall, 2005: 18). To some extent then this aspect of their model
brings in the discursive elements that Fuchs is keen to emphasise,
with the ability to normalise specific relations and network
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positions as a crucial manner in which corporations seek to
govern their supply chains. However, this discursive constitution
of relations then also works for Barnett and Duvall as their fourth
element of power in global governance, the productive (where
they explicitly include discursive elements) (Barnett and Duvall,
2005: 21).
Bringing this together to think about the global corporation as
an institution of global governance suggests that such a focus
would not only require an analysis to take account of
instrumental or compulsory power differentials in supply chain
networks, but to focus more fully on the manner in which
corporations seek to constitute and produce the socio-economic
and spatial terrain that the supply chain encompasses. Specifying
the required ends, however, requires more than an easy
presumption of profit maximisation; it is seldom if ever the case
that a corporation has a single directing mind or a closely knit
management team with a single and defined set of governing
principles and norms. While incorporation and contract relations
might often give credence to a reified view of the identity/
personality of the corporation, the corporation like many
institutions of global governance is actually subject to “bureau-
cratic politics” which is to say, internal bargaining, negotiation
and (internal) political resources actually shape decision making.
Thus, and again following Dallas, it might be better to
understand the governance function of the global corporation as
being located within a “power coalition”; here power is exercised
by, and on behalf of a coalition of actors and groups. Therefore,
Dallas (1995) argues:
while corporate goals derive from individual and group goals,
no one individual or group is usually powerful enough to
impose its goals on the corporation. Through corporate
processes, corporate goals emerge that satisfy the parties or
parties comprising the dominant coalition; these goals are
distinct from the goals of any one individual or group.
Furthermore, goals result from the communication among
individuals and groups concerning opportunities and dangers
represented by or to the organisational structure itself. (51–52)
Taking this approach the governance of global corporations’
supply chains starts to resemble the forms of on-going
(re)negotiation and alliance building that typify many of the
(usually identified) institutions of global governance. This is not
to say that no corporations are driven by a singular focus on
profit maximisation when governing their supply chain, but
rather that other goals of governance may frequently arise from
different power coalitions within global corporate networks
(Dallas, 1995: 58–59). At the very least there are likely to be
considerable differences on how to maximise profit!
The approach outlined above suggests a number of aspects of
a critical perspective on the governance of global supply chains.
If governance is to be seen as legitimate by those who are within
the network, this approach implies that for governance practices
to be effective they must be regarded as transparent and have
modes of accountability to deliver the value that can be derived
from these relations, over and above any basic market-based
form of contractual relations. However, the closer that the
relations between network “partners” approximate market
relations (and are governed via market mechanisms), the less
legitimacy will be required. The notion of the market will still
need to command legitimacy but this is a wider issue and not
immediately effected by one corporation’s action within its
supply chain. While it may seem a little odd to refer to a
democratic deficit in supply chain governance (although in itself
this may be the result of the discursive normalisation of market
relations as being “outside” democracy), where governance is
not limited to basic market mechanisms the reciprocity captured
by this phrase is likely to be of some importance. In global
governance the response to such deficits has often been to
empower, or seek to empower civil society, which directly
parallels the moves in CSR monitoring and auditing (and indeed
is often used as an example in mainstream debates). Therefore,
like other global governance institutions a fall-off of perceived
legitimacy may prompt exit from the network—suppliers will
seek other more amenable supply chains where plausible. Where
lock-in issues are evident, then other resistance activities may be
deployed, and civil society organisations may be drawn in to
engage with the legitimacy of specific elements of the
governance function.
However, in supply chain networks the actors that might
benefit from empowerment are not only civil groups (labour,
environmentalists, those seeking to promote human rights) but
also the smaller contractors themselves, whose interests and
requirements may often be quite different to the usual civil
society actors identified in accounts of global governance. Thus,
and interestingly, as Richard Locke points out in his discussion of
the manner in which labour standards have been promoted in
supply chain networks, whereas in early engagements auditing
and inspecting was seen as a process for gauging the need (or
otherwise) for sanctions for non-compliance, more recently
auditors (internal and contracted-external) have regarded their
work as developmental. It now often encompasses not merely
judgement of the fulfilment of codes’ requirements, but also,
when failings are identified, prompts support to enhance existing
and introduce new practices that are code-compliant (Locke,
2013: 181 and passim).
The negotiation and socialisation of network participants and
at least a partial recognition of their interests may be the manner
in which corporations most effectively govern these networks.
This approach has been evident (and well publicised) in the
garment supply chains of various large branded clothing
corporations (of which Gap, Levis and Nike are perhaps the
most obvious examples) leading to a more direct engagement
with suppliers in the chain to develop and promote schemes
intended to enhance the workers’ experience and build less
onerous (but more efficient) local working practices. However, as
Locke discovered in a comparison of two of Nike’s strategic
partners in Mexico, individual plants/contracted suppliers can
have quite different experiences within the same supply chain; in
this case one supplier had a developmental relationship with Nike
staff, gaining support and advice for up-skilling and better labour
conditions; the other had a more formalised, distant and less-
supportive engagement and as such retained many of the
shortcomings phased out from the first site. Interestingly, while
Nike’s intent seemed to be the same with both, the greater
distance to travel to the second site, leading to a great reliance on
phone/email communication and fewer visits resulted, Locke
(2013) concludes, in very different responses to the “demands” of
Nike’s supply chain governance; one site moving towards
preferred practices, the more distant adopting a minimalist
(partial) compliance position (Chapter 5). Again such practical
and spatial issues are well documented in mainstream global
governance analysis, and suggest that as there, global supply chain
governance will vary not merely by intent but through
accessibility and communicative effects, alongside surveillance
opportunities and “diplomatic” relations.
Conclusion
Global corporations are often engaged in the management of
extremely complex networks of subsidiaries, affiliates and
contractors, and thus the realm over which they have influence
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(and power) is often global. As the UNGC, EITI and other
moves to regulate labour standards (Locke, 2013) suggest, there
is a clear recognition in policy circles that corporations are
governing these networks not merely managing them. How-
ever, as production networks have fragmented, as markets have
become globalised and technological developments have
become less linear, hitherto hierarchical power relations
between core/lead corporations and the companies in the
(global) production networks have become less stable, less
settled and perhaps less unbalanced (Herrigel and Zeitlin,
2010: 553–554). As such, the governance of production
networks has become less like direct command and control,
and more like models of governance that have developed in
other areas of the global system.
Given that we already understand global governance as a
diverse set of institutions across a fragmented and discontinuous
political domain, it follows that we might also regard the
management of a corporation’s global complex as fulfilling a
similar (partial, but global) governance function. Therefore, the
purpose of the argument above has not been to suggest that the
recognition of the global governance function fulfilled by
corporations should replace the analysis of the impact corpora-
tions have on other institutions of global governance, nor the
discussion of how corporate practices may be shaped by
interactions with various international organisations. Rather, by
adding a third dimension to the account of corporations in global
governance the account of how the contemporary global political
economy is ordered and governed is made more comprehensive.
This account is meant to go beyond approaches that recognise
corporations as “partners” in global governance (Lamrad, 2012)
to suggest that much of the time, within their own networks they
are the primary agent of governance and not necessarily
dependent on other actors or social institutions for their
legitimacy.
As Macdonald (2014) suggests a focus on the political economy
of the supply chain allows analyses to recognise “the distinctive
forms of social power and organisation that exist within these
supply chains, and the contested distributional consequences of
such power”. Moreover, “simple assumptions about the effective
subordination of economic power to state authority in global
supply chains are becoming increasingly implausible” (11,
emphasis in original). Understanding global corporations’ control
of these supply chains as global governance immediately opens up
this realm of the global political economy to an interesting set of
analytical tools already developed to examine more normally
conceived forms of global governance, while also offering a
complementary analysis that indicates how global governance
may be experienced across the global system. By utilising the
insights from the study of global governance, we can develop a
critical approach to assessing the manner in which corporate rule
over their supply networks is justified and the limits to legitimacy
this governance function might confront.
Finally, however, the claim that this third dimension is a useful
site of further research and analysis is not a claim that all
corporations are equally able to govern their networks to the
same degree or level of effectiveness. Indeed, as with the
constellation of institutions and organisations that represent the
usual scope of global governance studies we are likely to find
some corporations achieve a level of control as good as, or even
beyond that which the most effective global governance regimes
exhibit; equally we will find other global corporations that are
effectively unable or unwilling to establish strong governance
functionality in the same way that we can identify weak or partly
ineffective global governance institutions. Most importantly, we
can usefully include global corporations within our analysis of
global governance more generally to develop a better account of
both global governance and the practices or global corporations
themselves.
Notes
1 For other ways of seeing global corporations, see for instance: Forsgren (2013) or
Collinson and Morgan (2009), both of which offer a range of other “lenses” an analyst
could adopt.
2 For instance, contributions to Harland et al. (2013).
3 While not all globally active firms are corporations, the majority are likely to be due
to the needs to mobilise large amounts of share capital to operate. Certainly there are
large privately owned firms (IKEA, Zara to name two) that operate global supply
chains, and large state owned corporations in some extractive sectors, but for the sake
of simplicity I assume that while these varying ownership structures might have some
impact on the political economy of the specific company, the governance issues and
power relations within the supply chain networks are likely to be relatively similar.
4 See the case studies in Kristensen and Zeitlin (2005).
5 This point draws on a confidential briefing from a CSR-team leader for a major US
retailer at the World Justice Project IV in the Hague, 2013.
6 This tripartite schema is drawn from Suchman (1995).
7 Burnham used his analysis of the rise of managerialism to make a number of highly
inaccurate political forecasts, but even his critics recognise he presented an early
account of an important social dynamic. For accounts of his wider work see Nichols
(1969: 31–39) and Orwell (1946 [1968]).
8 The drive for control as a (or even the) central aspect of the analysis of corporate
power, as opposed to property rights or efficiency concerns, is also a central motif of
Bowman (1996).
9 The approach on standards here differs from Büthe and Mattli (2011) who are
concerned with the development of standards as part of an analysis of global private
authority and various private actors influence on this process (including corpora-
tions). However, although their analytical model has a space for private, market-
based standards, they do not include the performance/quality standards deployed
within corporations’ networks and as such miss the sort of governance I am
exploring here.
10 Adapted from Dekker et al. (2013) and for Supplier Excellence Alliance, see http://
www.seaonline.org/.
11 This term is borrowed from Herrigel and Zeitlin’s discussion of these issues
(2010: 533).
12 This typology was adopted by the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development in its World Development Report 2013, deploying Gereffi et al. (2005).
13 See for instance the analysis of the UK supply chain for fresh vegetables discussed in
Dolan and Humphrey (2004).
14 For a discussion of the UNGC, see May (2015: 73–77).
15 For an earlier examination of corporations’ power to govern (focussing largely on US
corporations) see Eells (1962).
16 For an extended discussion of corporate power which this paragraph quickly sum-
marises see May (2015: Chapter 4).
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